> ## Documentation Index
> Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs.oleria.com/llms.txt
> Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further.

# Agent risk

> What each agent risk level and risk reason means, why it matters, and where to look in Oleria to check it.

Oleria gives each AI agent a risk level so you can fix the riskiest agents first. The level comes from the agent's risk reasons: specific conditions such as an agent anyone can use, or an agent that shares its account with other agents. This page explains each level and each reason, why it matters, and where to check it.

> [!NOTE]
>
> Agent discovery is enabled per workspace. To turn it on, contact us at [support@oleria.com](mailto:support@oleria.com).

## Risk reasons at a glance

Oleria has 17 risk reasons. The table lists them most severe first, the order in which the **Risk** tooltip lists an agent's reasons. Select a reason for what it means, why it matters, and everything to check.

| Risk reason | Severity | Check first |
| :- | :- | :- |
| [Anyone can use it, and it runs as an account with elevated privilege or can act as others](#anyone-can-use-it-and-it-runs-as-an-account-with-elevated-privilege-or-can-act-as-others) | Critical | The grant to anyone on the **Who Can Use** tab. |
| [Outside principals can use it, and it runs as an account with elevated privilege or can act as others](#outside-principals-can-use-it-and-it-runs-as-an-account-with-elevated-privilege-or-can-act-as-others) | Critical | The outside principals on the **Who Can Use** tab. |
| [Someone can become one of its accounts with elevated privilege](#someone-can-become-one-of-its-accounts-with-elevated-privilege) | Critical | The **Can impersonate this agent's accounts** list on the Access Graph. |
| [Anyone can use it, and its tools run on a credential every caller uses](#anyone-can-use-it-and-its-tools-run-on-a-credential-every-caller-uses) | High | The grant to anyone on the **Who Can Use** tab. |
| [Anyone can use it without signing in](#anyone-can-use-it-without-signing-in) | High | The grant to anyone on the **Who Can Use** tab. |
| [Principals outside the organization can use it](#principals-outside-the-organization-can-use-it) | Moderate | The outside principals on the **Who Can Use** tab. |
| [Someone can become one of its accounts](#someone-can-become-one-of-its-accounts) | Moderate | The **Can impersonate this agent's accounts** list on the Access Graph. |
| [Its tools run on a credential every caller uses](#its-tools-run-on-a-credential-every-caller-uses) | Moderate | The rows that show a **Credential** on the **Composition** tab. |
| [No one is accountable for it](#no-one-is-accountable-for-it) | Moderate | **Owners** and **Created By** on the agent details page. |
| [Shares an account with other agents](#shares-an-account-with-other-agents) | Moderate | **Shared With** on the **Agent Identities** tab. |
| [A credential on its accounts is risky](#a-credential-on-its-accounts-is-risky) | Moderate | The **Credential** node on the Access Graph. |
| [Runs as an account with elevated privilege and acts autonomously without approvals](#runs-as-an-account-with-elevated-privilege-and-acts-autonomously-without-approvals) | Moderate | The account whose **Privilege** is **Elevated** on the **Agent Identities** tab. |
| [Runs as an account with elevated privilege](#runs-as-an-account-with-elevated-privilege) | Low | The account whose **Privilege** is **Elevated** on the **Agent Identities** tab. |
| [Set to allow anyone, but not reachable yet](#set-to-allow-anyone-but-not-reachable-yet) | Low | The agent's **Audience**. |
| [Acts autonomously with tools that run without approval](#acts-autonomously-with-tools-that-run-without-approval) | Low | The rows whose **Approval** is **Automatic** on the **Composition** tab. |
| [No guardrail is configured](#no-guardrail-is-configured) | Low | The **Controls** tab. |
| [Its live configuration can change in place](#its-live-configuration-can-change-in-place) | Low | The versions whose **Immutable** value is **No** on the **Versions** tab. |

## Risk levels

An agent's risk level is the highest severity among its risk reasons.

| On screen | Meaning |
| :- | :- |
| **Critical** | The agent's most severe risk reason is Critical. |
| **High** | The agent's most severe risk reason is High. |
| **Moderate** | The agent's most severe risk reason is Moderate. |
| **Low** | The agent's most severe risk reason is Low. |
| **No known risk** | Oleria evaluated the agent and no risk reason applies. It reflects what the source application reports to Oleria, not a guarantee that the agent is safe. |
| A dash | Oleria hasn't evaluated the agent's risk yet. |

Oleria evaluates an agent's risk each time the agent's own integration syncs, from what Oleria holds at that moment about every connected application. A change made in another connected application shows only after that application's integration has synced and the agent's integration has synced after it.

## Where risk appears

| Place | What you see |
| :- | :- |
| **Risk** column in the [Agents inventory](https://docs.oleria.com/governance/agents-inventory.md) | The risk level. Point to the tag to see the level and **Risk Details**, a numbered list of the agent's risk reasons, most severe first. The list shows each reason's title, not its severity. The inventory opens sorted by **Risk**, highest first. |
| **Risk** field on the [agent details page](https://docs.oleria.com/governance/agent-details.md) | The risk level, with the same tooltip as the inventory. |
| **Critical or High Risk** tile | The number of agents whose risk level is **Critical** or **High**. |
| **Risk** filter | Filters by risk level. It has no option for **No known risk**. |
| **Risk Finding** filter | Filters to agents that have any of the risk reasons you select. A finding is a risk reason. |

## How to read risk reasons

Some risk reasons combine two simpler ones. When a combined reason applies, Oleria lists it in place of the reasons it combines:

| Combined reason | Listed in place of |
| :- | :- |
| **Anyone can use it, and it runs as an account with elevated privilege or can act as others** | **Anyone can use it without signing in** and **Runs as an account with elevated privilege** |
| **Outside principals can use it, and it runs as an account with elevated privilege or can act as others** | **Principals outside the organization can use it** and **Runs as an account with elevated privilege** |
| **Someone can become one of its accounts with elevated privilege** | **Someone can become one of its accounts** and **Runs as an account with elevated privilege** |
| **Anyone can use it, and its tools run on a credential every caller uses** | **Anyone can use it without signing in** and **Its tools run on a credential every caller uses** |
| **Runs as an account with elevated privilege and acts autonomously without approvals** | **Runs as an account with elevated privilege** and **Acts autonomously with tools that run without approval** |

The **Risk Finding** filter matches the reasons an agent lists, so filtering on a simple reason doesn't return an agent where a combined reason replaced it. To find every agent with a simple reason, select it together with every combined reason whose row names it. For **Runs as an account with elevated privilege**, that is four combined reasons. The first two combined reasons also apply to an agent that can act as others and has no elevated-privilege account, so the filter returns those agents too.

Each reason below shows its on-screen title and severity. The "Why it matters" and "What to check" notes are Oleria's guidance, not text you see in the product.

Two terms recur in the reasons below:

* An elevated-privilege account is an account the agent runs as whose **Privilege** is **Elevated** on the **Agent Identities** tab.
* An agent can act as others when an account it runs as, or a group or role that account belongs to, can act as an account, group, or role other than the agent's own accounts.

## Who can use the agent

### Anyone can use it without signing in

**Severity:** High

The agent's audience is **Public**, and a grant lets anyone use it without signing in.

**Why it matters:** Anyone who can reach the agent can make it act, and there is no identity to attribute an interaction to, limit, or revoke.

**What to check:** On the **Who Can Use** tab, find the principal that stands for anyone, such as an account whose **Type** is **Anonymous user**, and the entry point under **Via**. If the agent isn't meant to be public, remove that grant in the source application.

### Set to allow anyone, but not reachable yet

**Severity:** Low

The agent's audience is **Public**, but no grant lets an anonymous caller use it.

**Why it matters:** The agent is configured to be public. One grant to an anonymous principal opens it to anyone.

**What to check:** Confirm that the **Audience** of **Public** is intended. If it isn't, change the agent's audience in the source application.

### Principals outside the organization can use it

**Severity:** Moderate

Someone outside your organization can use the agent, and **Anyone can use it without signing in** doesn't apply. This includes a grant to anyone on an agent whose audience isn't **Public**.

**Why it matters:** People you don't manage can make the agent act with the access its accounts hold.

**What to check:** On the **Who Can Use** tab, look for principals whose **Type** is **External user**, for groups and roles that reach beyond your organization, and for a principal that stands for anyone, such as a group named for anonymous or all users. On AWS, a resource policy that allows any principal shows this way. Confirm that each one is intended.

### Anyone can use it, and it runs as an account with elevated privilege or can act as others

**Severity:** Critical

Anyone can use the agent without signing in, and the agent either runs as an elevated-privilege account or can act as others.

**Why it matters:** An anonymous caller can steer an agent that holds elevated-privilege access or can borrow another identity's access.

**What to check:** Find the public grant on the **Who Can Use** tab. On the **Agent Identities** tab, look for an account whose **Privilege** is **Elevated**. When no account is **Elevated**, the reason comes from what the agent's accounts can act as:

* Select an account's name on the **Agent Identities** tab to open the account's own page. For a non-human identity (NHI), look on the **Access** tab there for access the account gets by acting as another account or a group. When it acts as another account, **Impersonation** names that account.
* On the Access Graph, with **Access** selected under **Graph types**, select the account. When its side panel has a **Can impersonate** list, look there for accounts it can act as directly.
* Neither place shows a right the account holds through a group or role it belongs to, or a right to act as a role. When neither place explains the reason, check in the source application which accounts, groups, and roles the account, and each group and role it belongs to, can impersonate or assume.

Close the public access first, then reduce what the agent's accounts can reach and act as.

### Outside principals can use it, and it runs as an account with elevated privilege or can act as others

**Severity:** Critical

Someone outside your organization can use the agent, and the agent either runs as an elevated-privilege account or can act as others.

**Why it matters:** People you don't manage can steer an agent that holds elevated-privilege access or can borrow another identity's access.

**What to check:** Find the outside principals on the **Who Can Use** tab. Then check the agent's accounts as described under [Anyone can use it, and it runs as an account with elevated privilege or can act as others](#anyone-can-use-it-and-it-runs-as-an-account-with-elevated-privilege-or-can-act-as-others): first for a **Privilege** of **Elevated**, then for what they can act as. Remove the outside access that isn't intended, then reduce what the agent's accounts can reach and act as.

### Anyone can use it, and its tools run on a credential every caller uses

**Severity:** High

Anyone can use the agent without signing in, and something the agent depends on runs on a stored credential instead of the caller's own.

**Why it matters:** Every anonymous caller acts with that credential's access.

**What to check:** On the **Composition** tab, find the rows that can cause the reason, as described under [Its tools run on a credential every caller uses](#its-tools-run-on-a-credential-every-caller-uses). On the **Who Can Use** tab, find the public grant. Close the public access, or change the dependency to use each caller's own authority.

## The accounts it runs as

### Runs as an account with elevated privilege

**Severity:** Low

An account the agent runs as has a **Privilege** of **Elevated**.

**Why it matters:** Whatever the agent does, or is manipulated into doing, runs with that account's access.

**What to check:** Find the account on the **Agent Identities** tab, then see what it can reach on the **Access** tab. Reduce the account's access to what the agent needs.

### Shares an account with other agents

**Severity:** Moderate

Another agent runs as one of this agent's accounts.

**Why it matters:** Activity on a shared account can't be tied to one agent, and each agent holds the access the others need. A shared account doesn't count toward the agent's [Last Activity](https://docs.oleria.com/governance/agents-overview.md#key-terms).

**What to check:** On the **Agent Identities** tab, **Shared With** names the other agents. Give each agent its own account in the source application.

### A credential on its accounts is risky

**Severity:** Moderate

A credential that authenticates one of the agent's accounts has a risk of its own.

**Why it matters:** Whoever obtains that credential can act as the agent's account.

**What to check:** On the Access Graph, a **Credential** node connects to the account it authenticates. See [NHI secret risk recommendations](https://docs.oleria.com/posture/nhi-secret-risk-recommendations.md) for each NHI secret risk reason and its fix.

### Someone can become one of its accounts

**Severity:** Moderate

A principal other than the agent can act as one of the accounts the agent runs as.

**Why it matters:** That principal gets the account's access, and what it does through the account looks like the agent's activity.

**What to check:** Open the agent on the Access Graph with **Access** selected under **Graph types**. The **Can impersonate this agent's accounts** list names each principal and the account it can act as. Remove the right where it isn't needed. The list also shows principals the source platform itself operates. Those don't cause this reason.

### Someone can become one of its accounts with elevated privilege

**Severity:** Critical

A principal other than the agent can act as one of the agent's accounts that has elevated privilege.

**Why it matters:** That principal gets elevated-privilege access, and what it does through the account looks like the agent's activity.

**What to check:** Use the **Can impersonate this agent's accounts** list as described under [Someone can become one of its accounts](#someone-can-become-one-of-its-accounts). The **Agent Identities** tab shows which account has a **Privilege** of **Elevated**.

## How the agent acts

### Its tools run on a credential every caller uses

**Severity:** Moderate

Something the agent depends on runs on a stored credential instead of the caller's own, and other principals can use the agent. For an agent with no account of its own, the reason applies only when the source platform doesn't check each caller's own right to that credential.

**Why it matters:** Each caller acts with the stored credential's access, whatever their own access is.

**What to check:** On the **Composition** tab, a row can cause this reason only when the source application names a credential for it, its **Runs With** isn't **Delegation** or **Impersonation**, and its **State** isn't **Disabled**. Start with the rows that show a **Credential**. A row whose **Credential** cell shows a dash can cause it too. The dash appears when the source application names a credential that Oleria doesn't hold, which counts, and when it names none, which doesn't. To tell those rows apart, check the dependency's credential in the source application. On the **Who Can Use** tab, see who can use the agent. Limit who can use the agent, or change the dependency to use each caller's own authority.

### Acts autonomously with tools that run without approval

**Severity:** Low

The agent's autonomy is **Autonomous**, and a tool, Model Context Protocol (MCP) server, or delegate it depends on is declared to run with no approval step.

**Why it matters:** The agent can use those dependencies with no person involved.

**What to check:** On the **Composition** tab, find the rows whose **Approval** is **Automatic** and whose **Used As** is **Tool**, **MCP server**, or **Delegate**. Decide which of them should need a person's approval.

### Runs as an account with elevated privilege and acts autonomously without approvals

**Severity:** Moderate

The agent runs as an elevated-privilege account, its autonomy is **Autonomous**, and a tool, MCP server, or delegate is declared to run with no approval step.

**Why it matters:** The agent can use elevated-privilege access with no person involved.

**What to check:** Check the account on the **Agent Identities** tab and the **Approval** column on the **Composition** tab. Reduce the account's access, or require approval for the dependencies that act on it.

### No guardrail is configured

**Severity:** Low

A live version of the agent, or the agent itself when it has no versions, has dependencies and no guardrail among them.

**Why it matters:** Nothing recorded can block what the agent receives, produces, or does.

**What to check:** Open the **Controls** tab. Oleria sees only the guardrails the source application reports, so confirm in the source application before you act.

### Its live configuration can change in place

**Severity:** Low

A live version of the agent can change without becoming a new version.

**Why it matters:** The agent's behavior can change with no new version to review or return to.

**What to check:** On the **Versions** tab, find the versions whose **Immutable** value is **No**.

## Ownership

### No one is accountable for it

**Severity:** Moderate

The agent has no [accountable owner](https://docs.oleria.com/governance/agents-overview.md#key-terms).

**Why it matters:** No one answers for what the agent does, reviews its access, or decides when to retire it.

**What to check:** See **Owners** and **Created By** on the agent details page. Record an owner for the agent in the source application. If **Owners** lists a group and the reason still applies, Oleria hasn't counted the group's members yet. See [Owners](https://docs.oleria.com/governance/agent-details.md#owners).

## Contact us

For questions, contact us at [support@oleria.com](mailto:support@oleria.com).


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